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Adoption in California of the Field
Code of Civil Procedure: A
Chapter in American
Legal History
By Wuzx WmT BLUME*
IN his Personal Reminiscences of Early Days in California, dictated
to a stenographer at San Francisco m 1877,' Stephen J. Field, then a
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, stated:
In addition to the act concerning the courts and judicial officers
referred to, I took up the Code of Civil Procedure, as reported by the
Commissioners in New York, remodeled it so as to adapt it to the
different condition of things and the different organzation of the
courts in California, and secured its passage. It became what was
known as the California Civil Practice Act, and was afterwards
adopted n Nevada and in the Territories west of the Rock Moun-
tans2
Pointing out that California was the second state to adopt the New
York Code of 1848, known as the "Field Code," Hepburn, in Ins Histor-
ical Development of Code Pleading,' called attention to an act passed
by the California Legislature mn its first session (December 15, 1849-
April 22, 1850) and to "a more elaborate act of wider scope but of the
same general tenor and effect" passed during the second session of
the Legislature (January 6, 1851-May 1, 1851). According to Hep-
burn:
The relation between New York and California in these matters
was closer than appears on the surface. From 1841 to 1848, which was
within the period of Mr. David Dudley Field's greatest activity in the
cause of law reform, he had as his law partner hIs brother, Mr.
Stephen J. Field, now of the Supreme Bench. In 1848 the latter re-
moved to California, and became a member of the judiciary commit-
tee of the first California legislature. As such, he was very influential
in shaping the progress of California legislation. Nor did this mflu-
*Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
I S. J. Field, Personal Reminiscences of Early Days m California (copyright 1880).
("Pnnted for a few frends-NOT PUBLISHED").
2 Id. at 76.
3 HEPnuu, HIsToRcAL DEvELLoP mNT OF COE PLEAD n 93-94 (1897).
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ence cease with this. Other commonwealths in the west looked to
California for guidance. 4
Hepburn's assumption that Stephen J. Field was responsible for the
original (1850) adoption m California of the New York Code of Pro-
cedure of 1848 is not correct. Field was not a member of the Legisla-
ture during its first session (December 15, 1849-April 22, 1850) at
which the New York Code was originally adopted. He was a member
of the Legislature during its second session (January 6, 1851-May 1,
1851) and was appointed to the Judiciary Committee of the House.
Swisher, in Stephen J Field--Craftsman of the Law, states:
Field was a member of the Judiciary Committee. Another man
was chosen as chairman, for political reasons, but Field declared,
"I was foremost in the Committee." As a member of this Committee,
his greatest contribution was in the writing of the civil and criminal
practice acts. He took most of the work upon himself. He disregarded
the work of the preceding legislature and took the civil and criminal
codes of procedure recommended by David Dudley's committee to
the New York legislature as his guide. He modified and added to
these codes to meet the particular needs of Califorma. He said of
the task: "The amount of labor bestowed on these acts will be appre-
ciated when I say that I recast, in the two, over threb hundred sec-
tions, and added over one hundred new ones."5
In "The History of the Adoption of the Codes of Califorma," Miss
Parma, Law Librarian, Uiversity of California, Berkeley, stated in
1929: "The 'First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Plead-
ing. Code of Civil Procedure, Albany, Charles von Benthysen, Public
Printer, 1848' forms the base of the Practice Act of California of
1850 as drafted by Mr. E. 0. Crosby "7 Whether or not Mr. Crosby had
access to the First Report of the New York Commissioners it seems
clear that he had before hm and made use of the New York Code of
Procedure (not "Code of Civil Procedure") as amended and re-enacted
by the New York Legislature April 11, 1849. This is shown by the
fact that amendments to the New York Code made m 1849 were in-
cluded in the Califorma act of 1850. Where Deermg's legislative history
of a particular section of the present California code contains a ref-
erence to New York, the section cited will be found in the New York
Code of 1848 as amended in 1849.
The New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading filed four
4 Id. at 94 n.1.
5 SwisHEa, STE_ m J. FiS-C =rsA_ OF THE LAw 54 (1930).
6 22 L. LmRay J. 8 (1929).
7id. at 12.
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reports dealing with civil procedure, the first dated February 29, 1848,
the last dated December 31, 1849. The fourth, or final, report was
printed in 1850 and will be referred to as the draft code of 1850. In the
first two reports the code recommended by the Commissioners was
called a "Code of Procedure", in the others it was referred to as a "Code
of Civil Procedure." David Dudley Field-brother of Stephen J.
Field-was one of the Commissioners, and took the lead in drafting
the reports.
In their "Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley
Field Code,"8 Coe and Morse state that the code recommended by the
Commissioners in 1848 was adopted by the New York Legislature in
1848 "with very little change."9 Reppy in "The Field Codification
Concept"' 0 states that "On January 22, 1849, the Commssioners pre-
sented their Second Report, which proposed a number of additions and
amendments to the existing act. In response, the Legislature, on April
11, re-enacted the original code, including the additions and amend-
ments, thus increasing its size from 391 sections to 473 sections."" Fol-
lowing the final report of the Commissioners (printed in 1850) the
New York Legislature took further action. Eighty-eight sections of
the Code of 1849 were amended by an act passed July 10, 1851. One
other section was repealed and another amended in 1 85 1.12 Forty-one
sections of the Code of 1849 were amended by an act passed April 16,
1852. One other section was amended in 1852. Other sections were
affected by changes, though not expressly amended.'3
Miss Parma, in "The History of the Adoption of the Codes of Cali-
forma," referred to above,'4 made the following statements concerning
the final report of the New York Commissioners published in 1850:
Although the draft code of 1850 was not adopted in New York, it
had a marked influence on Californa law The California Practice
Act of 1850 was repealed by the Act of 1851 which was drafted by
Stephen J. Field, based chiefly on the New York Draft Code of Civil
Procedure of 1850.15
827 CoaRN._ L.Q. 238 (1942).
OId. at 241-42.
10Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, m DAVID DUDLEY Fn>--CrEruY
EssAYs 17 (Reppy ed. 1949).
11 Id. at 34.121ntroduction to THE CoDE oF PRocEURE oF =1i STATE OF NEw YoRx AS
AmENDED TO Apxm 16, 1852 at M (2d ed. Voorbies 1852).
Is Id. at XII-XIII.
'422 L. LmiBARy J. 8 (1929).
15id. at 12.
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The draft code of 1850 as "reported complete" by the New York
Commissioners was divided into four parts. In the words of the Com-
missioners: "The first relates to the courts of justice, their orgamzation
and jurisdiction, and the functions and duties of all judicial and min-
isterial officers, connected with them. The second embraces the subject
of civil actions, with all their incidents; the third relates to special pro-
ceedings; and the fourth to evidence."' 6 One of the Comnumssioners,
David Graham, dissented "upon the subject of evidence, the change
of the name of the writ of habeas corpus, and the organization and
functions of the courts of conciliation."
17
As a member of the House Judiciary Committee of the second
session of the California Legislature (1851), Stephen J. Field drafted
two statutes: (1) "An act concerning the Courts of Justice of this
State, and Judicial Officers" passed March 11, 1851. (2) "An act to
regulate proceedings in civil cases, in the Courts of Justice of this
State" passed April 29, 1851. Reviewing his "Life m the Legislature"
Field stated:
Immediately after the election I commenced the preparation of a
bill relating to the courts and ]udicial officers of the State, intending
to present it early in the session. The Legislature met at San Jose on
the first Monday of January, 1851, and I was placed on the Judiciary
Committee of the House. My first business was to call the attention
of the Committee to the bill I had drawn. Its principal provisions
remained in force for many years, and most of them are retained .n
the Code, which went into effect in January, 1873.18
The statute referred to followed the scheme of Part I of the draft
code of New York as "reported complete" in 1850, but, of course, had
to be related to the court system set up by California's first Constitu-
tion (1849) which had provided for a Supreme Court, District Courts,
County Courts, and Justices of the Peace. Field's statute covered m
detail the organization and jurisdiction of these courts and provided
for the establishment of other courts, but did not provide for "Courts
of Conciliation" although such courts were authorized by California's
constitution, and had been recommended by the New York Com-
missioners in their draft code "reported complete" in 1850.'9
As noted above, the New York draft code "reported complete"
16THE CODE OF CrvL PRocEDmi OF THE STATE OF NEw Yoan iv (1850). This 3s
the Report of the Commssioners on Practice and Pleading of Dec. 31, 1849.
17Id. at vii.
Is S. J. Field, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73.
1 9 THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF TH STATE OF NEw Youx §§ 180-81, 1523-53
(1850).
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in 1850 was divided into four main parts. These parts, following eigh-
teen sections of "Preliminary Provisions," were:
Part I. Of the Courts of Justice.
Part II. Of Civil Actions.
Part III. Of Special Proceedings.
Part IV Of Evidence.
In Califoria, Stephen J. Field's first statute (passed March 11, 1851)
dealt with the topics of Part I, his second statute (passed April 29,
1851) dealt with areas covered by Parts II, III, and IV with one major
exception. His Title XI ("Of Witnesses, and the Manner of Obtaining
Evidence") parallels a division of Part IV of the New York draft, but
does not include the remainder of David Dudley Field's proposed code
of evidence.20 That Stephen J. Field was reluctant to include features
of the New York draft not previously adopted by the New York Legis-
lature is indicated by other omissions. The following are illustrations
selected at random:
Section 113 of the New York Code of Procedure as re-enacted by
the New York Legislature April 11, 1849, reads as follows: "An exec-
utor or administrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly
authorized by statute, may sue without joining with him the persons
for whose benefit the suit is prosecuted." Section 599 of the draft code
of New York "reported complete" in 1850 repeated section 113 of the
Code of 1849 with this addition: "A person with whom, or in whose
name, a contract is made, for the benefit of another, is a trustee of an
express trust within the meaning of this section." The New York Com-
missioners stated in a note: "The last sentence is added to remove a
doubt which has been expressed." Section 8 of Califorma's first prac-
tice act (April 22, 1850) reads exactly the same as section 113 of the
New York Code of 1849. And the same is true of section 6 of Call-
20 Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 394, at 114 (California Practice Act of 1851) added
the following witness disqualifications not found in Sec. 1708 of the draft Code of
New York of 1850: "3d. Indians, or persons having one fourth or more of Indian blood,
in an action or proceeding to which a white person is a party- 4th. Negroes, or persons
having one half or more Negro blood, in an action or proceeding to which a white person
is a party." In 1854 the Supreme Court (as stated in a headnote) "Held, that the
words, Indian, Negro, Black and White, are generic terms designating race. That,
therefore, Chinese and all other people not white, are included in the prohibition from
being witnesses against Whites." People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854). Stephen J. Field,
who drafted the statutory provisions involved, was not a member of the Supreme Court
at the time this case was decided, but was a member of the Court when the same
question was presented in 1859 in Speer v. See Yup Co., 13 Cal. 73. The only error
assigned in the 1859 case-a civil action-was "the exclusion of a Chinese witness
offered by [the] plaintiff." The Court affirmed on the authority of the case decided in
1854. "TERRY, C.J. delivered the opinion of the Court-FIELD, J. concurring."
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forma's second practice act (April 29, 1851), although at that time
Stephen J. Field had before him the amendment recommended by the
New York Commissioners m 1850. The later history of this added sen-
tence may be of interest. On July 10, 1851, section 113 of the New York
Code of 1849 was amended by the New York Legislature by adding:
"A trustee of an express trust within the meaning of this section shall
be construed to include a person with whom, or in whose name, a con-
tract is made for the benefit of another." In 1854 this sentence was
added by the California Legislature to section 6 of the California act
of 1851. In Califorma's draft code of 1871 the sentence was changed
to read as proposed by the New York Commissioners in 1850.21 And
this is the language of section 369 of the present Code. Deering's legis-
lative history of the section states that it was enacted in 1872, based
on "N.Y. Code § 113", "Stats. 1850 Ch. 142 § 8", "Practice Act (1851)
§ 6" as amended in 1854.
Sections 604 and 605 of the draft code of New York "reported
complete" in 1850 provide:
An unmarried female may prosecute, as plaintiff, an action for her
own seduction, and may recover therein such damages as shall be
assessed in her favor.
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the
mother, may prosecute as plaintiff for the seduction of the daughter,
and the guardian for the seduction of the ward, though the daughter
or ward be not living with, or in the service of, the plaintiff, at the
time of the seduction or afterwards, and there be no loss of service.
These sections are not found in the New York Code of Procedure
(1849-1852) or in the California Practice Acts of 1850 and 1851, but
do appear in almost exactly the same language in sections 374 and 375
of the present California Code as enacted in 1872. The California Code
Commissioners in a note to their section 374 as proposed in 1871
stated: "This, and the succeeding section, are new-introduced by
the commissioners."22 Section 371 of the present California Code of
Procedure as enacted in 1872 provides: "If a husband and wife be
sued together, the wife may defend for her own right, and if the
husband neglect to defend, she may defend for his right also." A note
to this section in the code as proposed in 1871 states that "the words
'and if the husband neglect etc.,"' were added by the Commissioners
to section 8 of the Practice Act of 1851.23 The added words were in the
2 1 REVED LAws OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA-IN FouR CODES-CODE OF GIv
POCEDUBE § 369 (1871) (printed before enactment).
22 Id. § 374.
23 Id. § 371.
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draft code of New York "reported complete" in 1850 (section 601),
but were not included by Stephen J. Field in California's Practice Act
of 1851.
The Code of Civil Procedure proposed by the California Com-
inssioners in 1871 was divided into four parts:
Part I. Of Courts of Justice.
Part II. Of Civil Actions.
Part I1. Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.
Part IV Of Evidence.24
These parts were preceded by twenty-five sections of "Preliminary
Provisions," the entire arrangement being that of the draft code of
New York "reported complete" in 1850. The most striking develop-
ment beyond Stephen J. Field's Court and Practice Acts of 1851 was
the inclusion in 1871 of the code of evidence recommended by the
New York Commissioners in 1850. Part IV of Califorma's draft code of
1871 begins with a note: "The New York Comlmssioners say- . "
The material quoted is found at the beginning of Part IV of the New
York draft of 1850, at 694-696. Following this quotation the California
Commissioners stated: "In 1851 the legislature of this state adopted
the major portion of the Provisions of the New York Code relating to
evidence, and incorporated the provisions so adopted in the practice
act. We have taken those provisions and made them the basis of
part IV of this code, and have supplied the omitted portion." Other
quotes from the 1850 report of the New York Comussioners will be
found in California's draft code of 1871 following sections 1825 and
1864.
Part IV of the California draft code of 1871 was made up of 214
sections. In 42 of these sections earlier California statutes are cited
as sources. Following each of the other 172 sections, except one, there
is a reference to a particular section of "N.Y.C.C.P " A check of the
section numbers given will show that these references were to the
draft code of New York as "reported complete" in 1850.
Stephen J. Field was not a member of the Commission which
drafted the California Code of Civil Procedure proposed in 1871, but
was a member of the "Commission to Examine the Codes" appointed
by the Governor in 1873. The report of this Commission, dated October
11, 1873, stated:
We found the four Codes-the Political Code, the Penal Code,
the Civil Code, and the Code of Civil Procedure-as prepared by the
Commissioners and enacted by the Legislature, perfect in their analy-
241d. at v.
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sis, admirable m their order and arrangement, and fuirmshmg a com-
plete code of laws, the first time, we believe, that such a result has
been achieved by any portion of the Anglo-Saxon or British races.25
In its enactment of the Court and Practice Acts of 1851 and of the
Code of Civil Procedure of 1872 the Califorma Legislature did not
adopt or copy New York legislation, but, in reality, originated a new
code of civil procedure. This fact is significant, and its significance
points m two directions. Use of the draft code "reported complete" by
the New York Commissioners in 1850, as a source, meant that the per-
sons who drafted the California code had the full benefit of the ideas
of procedure reform generated by the genius of David Dudley Field.
On the other hand, David Dudley Field and his co-commissioners were
not ommscient, and the New York Legislature found it desirable to
add provisions not recommended by the Commissioners. Additions
to the section dealing with joinder of causes of action will serve as
illustrations:
Section 167 as adopted by the New York Legislature in 1849 pro-
vided:
The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same com-
plaint, where they all arise out of,
1. Contract, express or implied; or,
2. Injuries with or without force, to the person; or,
3. Injuries with or without force, to property; or,
4. Injuries to character; or,
5. Claims to recover real property, with or without damages for
withholding thereof, and the rents and profits of the same; or,
6. Claims to recover personal property, with or without damages,
for the withholding thereof; or,
7. Claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract or by operation
of law.
But the causes of action, so united, must all belong to one only of
these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action, and not
require different places of trial, and must be separately stated.
Section 663 of the draft code of New York of 1850 omitted classes 2
and 3, substituting after former class 4: "Other injuries to person
or property, or either." A note by the Commissioners stated that
"Amended Code, § 167" had been "altered, so as to allow some causes
of action to be united, which cannot be united under the section."
25 Quoted m Parma, The History of the Adoption of the Codes of California, 22
L. LmRAnxy J. 8, 17 (1929), and Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California
Statutes 1849-1953, 42 CALr. L. vv. 766, 777 (1954). For a detailed list of California
codes and statutes up to 1928 see Parma & Armstrong, The Codes and Statutes of
California: A Bibliography, 22 L. LmaRAny J. 41 (1929).
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Section 61 of Califoria's Practice Act of 1850 reads almost exactly
the same as section 167 of the New York Code of 1849. Section 64 of
California's Practice Act of 1851 reads the same as section 663 of the
draft code of New York of 1850 except for one addition (waste com-
mitted on real property) and two slight changes in language and
form. Section 427 of California's proposed code of 1871 reads the same,
with this addition: "but an action for malicious arrest and prosecu-
tion, or either of them, may be united with an action for either an
injury'to character or to the person."26 Section 427 of the proposed
code of 1871 was enacted in 1872 as section 427 of the present code. In
the meantime in New York (1852) section 167 as adopted m 1849
was amended by the Legislature by adding the words following indi-
cated by italics:
The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of
action, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated
legal or equitable, or both, where they all arise out of,
1. The same transaction, or transactions connected with the same
.subject of action.
These important provisions were not in the draft code "reported com-
plete" by the New York Commissioners in 1850, and were not adopted
in Californma until 1907 when the following was added to section 427
8. Claims ansing out of the same transaction, or transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action, and not included within
one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section.
In New York prior to the amendments made by the Legislature in
1852 there were no provisions for joining causes formerly "equitable"
in nature, and no provisions for joining "legal" and "equitable" actions.
And there could be no joinder of claims for "legal" relief unless all the
causes could be fitted into one of the classes set out in the joinder
section of the Code.27
26 Tins provision had been added to the section by the California legislature in
1855. Cal. Stat. 1855, ch. 155, § 4.
27 Referring to the provision for joinder of causes of action arising out of the same
transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action, Professor John
Norton Pomeroy ("Hastings College of the Law: University of California") in the
second edition of is treatise on Civil Remedies (1883), stated in sections 463-65: "The
principal design was undoubtedly to embrace the vast mass of equitable actions and
causes of action wich could not be classified. [B]ut the language is not confined
to them; it includes legal controversies as well. I quote the language used by an
eminent judge of the New York Court of Appeals, which, while it contains some unjust
remarks upon the authors of the New York code, is a very pointed and accurate descrip-
tion of the clause and of its mmediate design. 'The authors of the code, in framing
this and most of its other provisions, appear to have had some remote knowledge of
May, 1966]
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Stephen J. Field in his Reminiscences (quoted at the beginning of
this paper) stated that his practice act of 1851 had been "adopted in
Nevada and in the Territories west of the Rocky Mountains." One of
the other territories which adopted the act was Montana.28 The lan-
what the previous law had been. This provision as it now stands was introduced in the
amendment of 1852, because the successive codes of 1848, 1849, and 1851, with
characteristic perspicacity, had in effect abrogated equity jurisdiction in many im-
portant cases by failing to provide for a uion of subjects and parties in one suit
indispensable to its exercise. It is certainly impossible to extract from a provision so
loose, and yet so comprehensive, any rules less liberal than those which have long pre-
vailed in courts of equity."' New York & N.H.R.R. v. Schuyler, 17 N.Y. 592, 604 (1858).
Referring to the joinder of causes section of the Field Code (§ 143 as drafted in 1848)
Professor McCaskill, in a memorandum included by Coe and Morse in their Chronology
of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 Coiuqxu. L.Q. 238, 240
(1942), stated: "Not by any stretch of the imagination can sec. 143 include any equit-
able remedy. Sees. 97 [permissive joinder of plaintiffs]-99 [required joinder of parties
united in interest] apply the equity rules on joinder of parties, supposedly to all types
of claims, but they can have no application to cases where there is but one plaintiff
and one defendant. They probably provide adequately for all joinders in equity cases,
and do not subject the commissioners to the criticism aimed at them by Comstock, J.,
in N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, but they do not bridge the gap
between legal and equitable remedies. There was no attempt to do this. By amend-
ment of the code m 1852, this counterclaim section of the final report [December 31,
1849, printed in 1850] was adopted, and immediately after it came an amendment of
section 143, expressly providing for a joinder of legal and equitable remedies in one
suit. This was an important step in code procedure." In 1857, the Supreme Court
of California held that § 14 of the California Practice Act of 1851, requirng joinder of
parties united in interest, "was intended to apply to suits in equity, and not to actions at
law." Andrews v. Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330, 333 (1857). Commenting on this
case in the third edition of Pomeroy's treatise on Civil Remedies (1894) John Norton
Pomeroy, Jr., in a note at 251, stated: "The same court has, in later cases, pursued a
course of decision more in accordance with the spirit of the code, and has, as completely
perhaps as any other tribunal, abandoned all attempt to preserve a distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity." Stephen J. Field was not a member of the Califorma
Court when the Andrews case was decided, but was a member when Jones v. Steam-
ship Cortes, 17 Cal. 487 (1861), was decided, and concurred in the opinion of the court.
In this case the court held that under the Califorma system of pleading "a cause of
action in tort may be united with a cause of action on contract, if the two causes of
action arise out of the same transaction." Ibid. Cope, J., delivering the opinion of the
court, stated: "Our system of pleading is formed upon the model of the civil law, and
one of its principal objects is to discourage protracted and vexatious litigation.
The [New York] code contains a special provision upon this subject, but we think
that the effect of our statute is the same, and that the construction would not be
altered by the incorporation of a similar provision." Id. at 497-98. This somewhat
startling attempt to "amend" the California Practice Act of 1851 by adding the "trans-
action" provision added to the New York Code in 1852, seems to have been forgotten
when Stark v. Wellman, 96 Cal. 400, 31 Pac. 259 (1892), was decided.
28 HEPBUrN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 106, states: "Montana also has received its
legislation very largely from California. Early in 1865 the provisions of the California
practice act were substantially adopted by the first legislature of Montana in an act
to regulate proceedings in civil cases. There was a revision in 1879, when a code of
civil procedure framed on the lines of the California statute was adopted "
[Vol. 17
guage of the Montana joinder section as adopted m 1865 is set out m
Toelle, "Joinder of Actions-With Special Reference to the Montana
and Califorma Practice."29 Referring to "the Califorma experience,"
Toelle stated: "Prior to 1907, Califorma, as is still true of Montana, had
no provision for the joinder of claims arising out of the same transac-
tion, or transactions connected with the subject of the action. This
omission was the subject of comment and disapproval, 0 citing Stark
v. Wellman."' In that case, Temple, C., stated:
The classification of causes of action which may be united under
section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while intended to be
founded upon manifest reason, is nevertheless to some extent ar-
bitrary, and differs materially from that which prevails in most states.
In nearly all, for instance, causes of action arsing out of the
same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject
of action, may be united. Had this been in our code, it would have
authorized the joinder of the causes of acti6n in this case. It was in
the code from which it is supposed ours was copied, and if so, was,
of course, designedly omitted.32
From the history of the joinder section, reviewed above, we know
that the provision referred to was not "designedly omitted" but
sunply was not in the draft code "reported complete" by the New
York Commssioners in 1850 which served as the basis of the Cali-
forma Code.33 The story in Montana came to an end in 1961 when the
code provisions for joinder were repealed, and a rule adopted providing
for free joinder as in the Federal Rules.34
In his historical account of the "Extraordinary Writs" m Califor-
ma,'1 B. Abbott Goldberg stated: "It is important to note that the
Califorma Practice Act of 1851 followed the spirit and in many cases
the letter of the [New York] Proposals of 1850 because these give
us the clue to what may have originally been intended by the statutory
provisions in regard to certiorari."3 This and other references to the
New York Draft Code of 1850 well illustrate the use that must be
made of his particular source in tracing the history of Califorma
procedure.
2918 CALm'. L. REv. 459 (1930).
o Id. at 466.
3196 Cal. 400, 31 Pac. 259 (1892).
32 Tooele, Joinder of Actions-With Special Reference to the Montana and California
Practice, 18 CAIaF. L. REV. 459, 468 (1930).
33 An attempt to add thIs provision by ]udicial interpretation was made in Jones
v. Steamship Cortes, 17 Ca. 487 (1861).
34 MoNT. R. Crv. P. 18.
3536 CALwn. L. REv. 558 (1948).
36 Id. at 561.
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Judicial Reception and Interpretation
Stephen J. Field was appointed to the Supreme Court of Califorma
October 13, 1857, became Chief Justice September 12, 1859; and
served as Chief Justice until May 20, 1863, when he resigned to become
a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.37 Prior chief jus-
tices of the California Court had been: Serranus Clinton Hastings-
Dec. 22, 1849-Jan. 1, 1852; Henry A. Lyons-Jan. 1, 1852-March 31,
1852; Hugh C. Murray-March 31, 1852-Sept. 18, 1857, David S.
Terry-Sept. 18, 1857-Sept. 12, 1859. Other members of the court
during this period were Nathaniel Bennett, Solomon Heydenfeldt,
Alexander Anderson, Alexander Wells, Charles H. Bryan, Peter H.
Burnett, Joseph G. Baldwin, W W Cope, and Edward Norton. In a
"sketch" published in 18818 "John Norton Pomeroy, LL.D., Professor
of Law in the Hastings Law Department of the University of Cali-
forma" stated that "The Court, m its early years," that is, before Field
became a member, "had not always commanded [the] entire
confidence and respect of the public "9 This "sketch" had been
submitted to Field who altered it "in several particulars." Field's
changes in the "sketch" were explained to Pomeroy m a letter dated
June 21, 1881.
The severe condemnation you expressed of the old Supreme Court
of the State is also omitted. It still states-what is true-that the court
did not at all times have the confidence of the public, but that this
was owing to the character-intellectual and moral-of persons who
are now dead. The living members of the old court are Judge
Hastings-the founder of your Law Department, Judge Hydenfeldt,
Judge Bennett, Judge Burnett and Judge Terry. No one ever ques-
tioned the integrity or ability of Hydenfeldt and Bennett, or the in-
tegrity of Burnett or Terry. Hastings you know, and he was never
regarded as a shining light. Terry had ability but his Southern preju-
dices and partizanship affected his judgment. The judges who
brought the greatest reproach upon the bench, were Wells, Murray
and Anderson, all of whom are dead. I think the sweeping language
you used would create much unpleasant feeling.40
In the "sketch" referred to, Professor Pomeroy further stated that the
"most important work of Judge Field was after Judges Baldwin and
37 1 CALiFoRNIA JuiusPrUDENCE 2d xlviii (1952).
8sPomeroy, Introductory Sketch, in Souz AccouNT or -mn WornK OF STEPHEN J.
FsuuD (Black & Smith ed. 1881). An enlarged edition was published in 1895.
89 Id. at 27 (both editions).
40 Graham, Four Letters of Mr. Justice Field, 47 YALE L.J. 1100, 1101 (1938). A
portion of this letter was quoted by Professor Pomeroy's son-John Norton Pomeroy,
Jr.-m a sketch of "Stephen Johnson Field," in 7 GRPAT AmmCAN LAwYERs 3, 34
n.14 (Lewis ed. 1909).
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Cope had become his associates on the Bench. They were able and
learned judges, and fully bore their share of the labors of the Court."41
According to Professor Pomeroy the Court had risen rapidly in
"the estimation of the profession," until it had reached a position in
the country "second to no other State tribunal."42 A representative of
a leading law publishing house of Boston had told him that of 'late
years the demand had changed from the New York to the Califoria
reports. Everywhere through the Western and Northwestern States,
he said, the profession generally wished to obtain the Califorma re-
ports as next in authority after those of their own States."43
Before giving a summary of Field's accomplishments as a member
of the Califorma court, Pomeroy undertook an estimate of Field's
"judicial character" mentioning these "qualities" (1) Ample legal
learnig. (2) Devotion to principle. (3) Creative power. (4) Fear-
lessness.44 In his estimate of Field's "creative power" Pomeroy wrote:
Judge Field's peculiar talent as a legal reformer was shown in his
purely legislative work done while a member of the State Assembly,
and described in a previous division of this essay He exhibited the
same power and tendency upon the Bench. They were shown in his
constant rejection of ancient common-law dogmas, no matter how
firmly settled upon authority, which had become outgrown, obsolete,
and unfitted for the present condition of society, and in the substitu-
tion of more just, consistent, and practical doctrines adapted to the
needs of our own country and people. I merely mention, as sufficient
examples of this class, his decisions upon the nature and effect of
mortgages, and those concerning the ownership of gold and silver
while in the soil, by which he boldly swept away the common-law
rules on the subject, with all the absurd reasoning upon which they
had been founded. The same power and tendency were shown in his
accurate perception of those principles and rules contained in foreign
systems of jurisprudence which should be borrowed and incorporated
into the judicial legislation of the State, both for the purpose of pro-
tecting many peculiar rights of property and special interests, and of
regulating social relations, existing in California but unknown in
nearly all the other States. Illustrations of the first land may be found
in his series of most important decisions concerning "pueblos" and
the mumcipal and proprietary rights belonging to them; and concern-
ing Mexican land-grants, in which the rules were borrowed from the
Spamsh-Mexican codes; and in those concerning the occupation of
public lands and mining and water rights. A most illustrative example
of the other land is seen in his decisions relating to the community
41Pomeroy, supra note 38, at 27.
421d. at 28.
48 Id. at 28 n.
44 Id. at 28-37.
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property of husband and wife-an incident of the marrage relation
derived from the Spamsh-Mexican jurisprudence-which placed the
rights of the two spouses in that unique species of property upon a
frm and equitable foundation. The same power and tendency are
shown in his decisions concerning procedure, in which he more ably
and consistently, perhaps, than any other ]udge, has carred into oper-
ation the true spirit and intent of the reformed American procedure.45
Professor Pomeroy's estimate (last sentence quoted above) that Field
as a state judge "more ably and consistently, perhaps, than any other
judge" had "carried into operation the true spirit and intent of the
reformed American procedure" is entitled to emphasis, not only be-
cause of Pomeroy's familiarity with Field's work on the California
Court, but also because Pomeroy was the author of a justly-celebrated
treatise on the "new procedure" originally published in New York in
1876.6 Pomeroy knew the "spirit and intent" of the reformed proce-
dure, and, having examined the decisions of all the code states and
territories, was in a position to know whether Field, as a state judge,
had "carried into operation the true spirit and intent of the reformed
American procedure more ably and consistently, perhaps, than
any other judge," meaning any other judge in the United States. When
it is recalled that Field drafted the California court and practice acts
of 1851 from the draft Code of Civil Procedure "reported complete"
by the New York Commissioners in 1850, and that he had been closely
associated with the chief author of the New York draft-his brother,
David Dudley Field-during a period in which David Dudley was
very active in advocating his ideas of codification and procedure re-
form, it seems reasonable to accept Pomeroy's estimate without too
much doubt.
Two of Field's opinions delivered in 1860 will serve as illustrations.
The first paragraph of Field's opinion in Coryell v. Cam47 reads:
This is an action of ejectment to recover a tract of land situated
within the county of San Francisco. The complaint is of a character
which has frequently elicited observations of disapprobation from this
Court. It is filled with matters relating to the title of the plaintiffs,
which have no place in pleadings, and should only be presented as
evidence in the case. Had the defendant made the application, these
matters would, undoubtedly, have been stricken out, as redundant,
at the cost of the plaintiffs. It is not within the wit of man to devise
45 Id. at 32-33.
46 See sketch of "John Norton Pomeroy" by Ins son, John Norton Pomeroy, Jr., in
8 GREAT AminEmcAN LAWYERS 91, 110-11 (Lewis ed. 1909). A second edition of
Pomeroy's Civil Remedies was published in 1883 after Pomeroy had become a member
of the Hastings faculty. A third edition was published by Pomeroy, Jr., in 1894.
4716 Cal. 567 (1860).
[Vol. 17THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
more simple rules of pleading than those prescribed by the Practice
Act of this State, and there is no excuse for any departure from them.
That facts, and not the evidence of facts, should be alleged, is not less
a rule of pleading in our system than it was under the former system,
which has been superseded. Thus, in the present case, the complaint
should only have alleged, that on some day designated the plaintiffs
were possessed of the land, describing it; that whilst thus possessed,
the defendant entered upon the same, and ousted them, and has ever
since withheld the possession from them, to their damage; specifying
such sum as might cover the value of the use and occupation from
the date of the ouster.
48
The first two paragraphs of Field's opinion m Green v. Palmer49
read:
The complaint, in this case, as a pleading, has no precedent, and,
we trust, will never serve as one. It is stuffed full of irrelevant matter
-suggestions, charges and statements, which subserve no useful pur-
pose, and are only calculated, when read to the jury, to excite preju-
dice against the defendants.
The action is for the seizure and conversion of a bag of gold coin,
of the value of $4,000, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff.
After the usual, and the only necessary averments as to the plaintifFs
ownership and possession of the property, its value, and its forcible
seizure by the defendants, and its conversion to their use to his dam-
age, the complaint proceeds to detail the manner in which the seizure
was made, with the incidents occurnng on the street, and everything
done by the defendants, the plaintiff and the "crowd," relating to or
constituting the evidence of the wrongful conversion. All this narra-
tion should have been stricken out, as nrelevant and redundant
matter, and the Court erred in refusing the motion made for that
purpose. The rules of pleading, under our system of practice, are
very sinple, and can be readily followed; yet we find, in numerous
instances before us, pleadings filled with recitals, digressions and
stones, which only tend to prolixity and obscurity We extract from
a manual, written by one of the commissioners engaged in framing
the New York code, some rules of pleading, with the observations of
the writer thereon, as expressive of our views as to what should be
stated in the pleadings under our Practice Act. The greater portion
of the Practice Act, it is known, is taken from that code. We omit the
first rule given in the manual, and commence with what is there
designated as the second so
The quotations from the manual referred to occupy three and a quarter
pages of the opinion as printed. The rules selected for inclusion m the
opinion, and renumbered, were:
481d. at 571.
40 15 Cal. 411 (1860).
50Id. at 414.
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First Rule.-Facts only must be stated.
Second Rule.-Those facts, and those only, must be stated which
constitute the cause of action, the defense, or the reply
Thtrd Rule.-All statements must be concisely made, and when
once made, must not be repeated. 51
Deermg's current Code of Civil Procedure, following section 426,
gives "the entire manual written by David Dudley Field, from which
the court makes only certain extracts."52 The omitted First Rule was
that "pleadings must be true."
Codes of Civil Procedure based on the "Field Code," as enacted in
New York or California, were adopted in: Minnesota, 1851, Oregon,
1854; Washington, 1854; Nebraska, 1855; Kansas, 1859; Nevada, 1861,
Dakota, 1862; Idaho, 1864; Arizona, 1864; Montana, 1865; Wyoming,
1869; Oklahoma, 1890.53 Lawyers and judges seeking to understand
the "new procedure" quite naturally looked to New York for guidance.
But, "unfortunately the code in New York came to be construed by
able judges who were opposed to its spirit."" In Califorma, on the
other hand, after Stephen J. Field became a member of the state
Supreme Court m 1857, the code had a champion-an articulate and
forceful judge who understood the nature of the reform and who,
according to Professor Pomeroy, "more ably and consistently, perhaps,
than any other judge" in the United States "carried into operation the
true spirit and intent of the reformed American procedure."55 This
may have been the chief reason why lawyers and judges of the western
and northwestern code states were interested in obtaining reports of
the decisions of the Califorma court.
51 Id. at 414-17.
52 H. M. Fmu, THE LIFE oF DAviD DvrLnE Fnmx 69 (1898) lists A Short Manual
of Pleading under the Code as one of a series of 'law reform tracts" published by David
Dudley Field.
53 HE:pBURN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 90-113.
54 CLAnw, CODE PLF n NG 47 (1928). According to Professor (later, Judge) Clark
the attitude of the New York judges was well expressed by Winslow, C.J., of Wis-
consm: "The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment wlch the infant code received from
the New York judges is a matter of history. They had been bred under the common-
law rules of pleading and taught to regard that system as the perfection of logic, and
they viewed with suspicion a system which was heralded as so simple that every
man would be able to draw Ins own pleadings. They proceeded by construction to
import into the code rules and distinctions from the common-law system to such an
extent that in a few years they had practically so changed it that it could hardly be
recognized by its creators." McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W 445,
446 (1910).
55 Pomeroy, supra note 38, at 33.
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Influence of the Frontier
In an extensive study of "Territorial Courts and Law" the present
writer assisted by Research Associate Elizabeth Brown attempted to
identify some of the unifying factors in the development of American
legal institutions.a Part I of the study traced developments which led
to the establishment by Congress of a simple judicial system for the
territories of the United States. Part II discussed some of the in-
fluences which tended to unify territorial law In both parts of the
study a look-out was kept for legal developments that would support
Turner's "frontier theory" of American history 57 Nothing was found
to support the Turner theory, but much was found to support Tocque-
Ville's views expressed in the 1830's:
A defective English law (and there are many) is imported into
America by the first emigrants. They modify it, adapt it after a
fashion to their social condition; but they still retain for it a super-
stitious respect, and are unable to nd themselves of it entirely The
second emigration takes place; these same men plunge once again
into the wilderness. This time the law is modified in such a way that
it has almost lost the stamp of its ongm. But it requires still a third
emigration before it ceases to exist.58
The second emigration referred to was into the Oio and Mississippi
valleys. The third plunge into the wilderness envisioned by Tocqueville
was a migration from these valleys to areas farther west. The settle-
ment of California was a part of this third emigration as a consequence
of which "superstitious respect" for "defective" English law "ceases to
exist."59
50 (Pts. I & II) 61 Mica. L. REV. 39, 467 (1963).
57 For Turner's theory and attempts to apply it see Blume, Civil Procedure on the
American Frontier, 56 MicH. L. REv. 161, 204-206 (1957).
5
8 PERsoN, TocQuEVIm=L & BEAUMONTr ix Aim cA 567 (1938).
59 Of interest is Bryce, The Character of California, in 3 THE A.mmcAN CominON-
WEALTH 226 (1888)" "This mixed multitude, bringing with it a variety of manners,
customs, and ideas, formed a society more mobile and unstable, less governed by fixed
beliefs and principles, than one finds in such North-Western communities as I have
just mentioned. Living far from the steadying influences of the Eastern States, the
Californians have developed, and are proud of having done so, a sort of Pacific type,
which though differing but slightly from the usual Western type, has less of the English
element than one discovers in the American who lives on the Atlantic side of the Rocky
Mountains. Add to this that California is the last place to the west before you come to
Japan. That scum which the westward moving wave of emigration carries on its
crest is here stopped, because it can go no farther." Bryce was in San Francisco in the
fall of 1881, id. at 244, and again in 1883, id. at 228.
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In an account of "The Acquisition of Califorma, Its Influence and
Development Under American Rule,"60 Cushing stated:
The very fact that the pioneers of the fifties were here is sufficient
to demonstrate that they were not men who cared to walk in the well-
trodden paths of the older communities. They braved the dangers of
the plains, the tropics and the seas to cast their fortunes in the new
land. They had dared themselves to experiment in the untrodden
paths of adventure, and it is little wonder that they were seemingly
equally willing to experiment in legislation. It has in fact been pointed
out that one of the distinctive features of the history of legislation
in Califoria is the willingness of the inhabitants to try experiments. 61
The judicial system established by California's first Constitution
(1849) was similar to that established by Congress for the territories
of the United States beginning in 1836. This uncomplicated territorial
system designed for frontier areas was "the end-product of a long
period of experimentation commenced by the preliminary drafts of
the Northwest Ordinance prior to 1787, and carried forward by Con-
gress and the governments of the twelve territories organized before
1836."62 First established in Wisconsin in 1836, the system was con-
tinued in Iowa Territory when it was created out of Wisconsin Ter-
ritory in 1838, and when Iowa Territory became a state m 1846 the
territorial system served as the basis of the first judicial system of the
state. It is generally recogmzed that Iowa's Constitution of 1846 was
one of the sources of the California Constitution of 1849.63
60 8 CAine. L. REv. 67 (1920).
61Id. at 75.
62 Blume & Brown, Territoral Courts and Law (pt. I), 61 MicH. L. REv. 39, 50
(1963).
6 3 See "Introduction" by Judge William W Morrow to 1 CALoaNuI JurispRituNcE
2d xxx (1952), quoting from The Establishment of a State Government tn California by
Cardinal Goodwin, and from The Genests of Californids First Constitution by Rockwell
D. Hunt. In portions of Hunt's account not quoted by Morrow the author (at 37 and 55)
stated: "There was a great dearth of books of reference in Monterey during the session of
the Convention. It was believed that there were not above fifty volumes of law and his-
tory in all the town, [one writer stating later] that 'copies of the State Constitutions of
Iowa and New York were the only ones that could be obtamedl' But precedents were not
so scarce. Gwm, with politic foresight had brought with him a copy of Iowa's
Constitution of 1846, and this he proposed as a model for the present Constitution.
For a time, since there was a grat dearth of reference books, it seemed as though this
model might be closely followed. But other State Constitutions were obtained, and
that of New York soon became a favorite. Hastings proposed the Constitution of
the United States as a guide, since he urged 'the record of the debates on that
Constitution embraced the principles of all the State Constitutions."' Hastings,
originally from New York, had been admitted to the bar in Indiana in 1836 and had
practiced law in Iowa Territory from 1837 to 1846, when Iowa became a state. He
was for a time president of the Territorial Council, and was elected Chief Justice of
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The act of Congress winch established a government for Iowa
Territory m 1838 provided: "[T]he judicial power of the said Territory
shall be vested m a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and
m justices of the peace. The supreme court shall consist of a chief
justice, and two associate judges, any two of whom shall be a
quorum ."6 Article VI of California's first Constitution (1849)
provided:
Sec. 1. The judicial power of tis State shall be vested in a Su-
preme Court, in District Courts, in County Courts, and in Justices of
the Peace. The legislature may also establish such municipal and
other inferior courts as may be deemed necessary
Sec. 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and
two Associate Justices, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum.
An elected "County Judge" was to hold the County Court, perform the
duties of "Surrogate, or Probate Judge," and, with two Justices of the
Peace, hold "Courts of Sessions." "Tribunals for conciliation" were
authorized.
Having been developed to serve frontier settlements as the Ameri-
can frontier moved westward, the territorial system of court organiza-
tion was readily adaptable to the frontier conditions which faced the
people of California m 1849-1851. It must be noted, however, that the
simple court systeiA contemplated by Califorma's first Constitution
(1849) was made unnecessarily complex by Field's Court Act of 1851
which provided m Chapter I.
The following shall be the Courts of Justice of this State. 1st. The
Supreme Court. 2d. The District Courts. 3d. The Superior Court of
the City of San Francisco. 4th. The County Courts. 5th. The Courts
of Sessions. 6th. The Probate Courts. 7th. The Justices' Courts. 8th.
The Recorders' Courts. 9th. The Mayors' Courts. 65
Field had had no prior frontier experience and, obviously, was in-
fluenced by his acquaintance with the court systems of the eastern
states. His complex system, after some modification, became the basis
of Part I of the draft Code of Civil Procedure of 1871.
Governor Peter H. Burnett m his first message to the first session
of the California Legislature (December 21, 1849) recommended the
adoption of the following codes:
1. The definition of crmes and misdemeanors as known to the Com-
mon Law of England.
the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa m 1848. He came to Calfforma m 1849. 1
CAIxFoRNu JuUsRUDENCE 2d xlvii (1952).
64 5 Stat. 237 (1838).
65 Cal. Stat. 1851, Ch. 1, ch. 1, at 2.
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2. The English Law of Evidence.
3. The English Commercial Law.
4. The Civil Code of Louisiana.
5. The Louisiana Code of Practice.60
February 1, 1850, a petition was presented to the Legislature by a
group of San Francisco lawyers recommending that the Legislature
"retain, m its substantial elements, the system of the civil law, as
passed by His Excellency the Governor, m preference to the English
Common Law"6 7 In a report dated February 27, 1850, the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate rejected these proposals, and, after a full
and interesting comparison of the civil law and common law legal
systems recommended adoption of "the English Common Law, as
received and modified m the United States; m other words the
AMERICAN COMMON LAW"68 In the course of this report the
Committee stated:
To undertake, by statute or by code, to establish a just and accu-
rate rule for every contingency of human avarice and of human pas-
sions, and for all the endless phases of vaned life, is to essay a task
which never yet was accomplished-a task which, until the Almighty
shall change the nature and attributes of man, must forever remain
impracticable and absurd. In truth, all the provisions of constitutions,
and statutes, and codes, are but pebbles on the sea-shore-the vast
ocean of legal science lies beyond. The most therefore, that can be
expected from the present Legislature is, to set the machinery of gov-
ernment m operation in all its departments, establish a system of
pleadings and practice, enact certain statutes providing for the most
common cases of judicial investigation; and for the rest, resort to one
of the two great repositories of legal learning, the Common or the
Civil Law 69
Though rejecting the idea of complete codification, the Committee
did "recommend the establishment of the system of pleadings and
practice" which had been laid before the Legislature. This conces-
sion to the concept of codification paved the way for the enactment of
the Practice Act of 1850 which was based on the New York Code of
Procedure as amended m 1849. Elisha Oscar Crosby, who was chair-
man of the Senate Judiciary Committee and who drafted the Practice
Act of 1850, was a New York lawyer who came to California in 1849.70
66 Shuck, Adoption of the Common Law, m HIsToRY OF TE BENCH AND BAR OF
CAL oRNI 47 (Shuck ed. 1901).
67 Id. at 48.
681 Cal. 588, 604 (Appendix) (1850).
69 Id. at 591.
70 Shuck, op. cit. supra note 66, at 48-49.
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In his address to the Legislature in 1849 Governor Burnett pointed
out that "a sufficient number of copies of both the civil code and the
code of practice [of Louisiana] could be procured in New Orleans at
a much less cost than they could be published here."71 The Senate
Committee, in support of its recommendation made February 27,
1850, that the Common Law be adopted instead of the Civil Law,
stated:
Books are to a lawyer or a judge what tools are to a mechanic, or
surgical instruments to a surgeon; and it is important that such books
should be cheap, accessible, and convenient for use Adopt the
Common Law, and lawyers, and judges, and the community at large
can readily procure all necessary books, at a moderate price, in their
own tongue. On the other hand, substitute the Civil for the Com-
mon Law, and it will be with great delay and expense, n limited sup-
plies, and in strange tongues, that books can be procured which will
be found absolutely necessary for the lawyer and judge in the intelli-
gent administration of the system.
72
How far the Legislature was Influenced by the argument over "books"
is difficult to determine, but it is known that the availability of par-
ticular law books in a particular frontier community was sometimes a
factor in the selection of law for the community For instance, the fact
that Governor St. Clair of the Northwest Territory brought with him
a compilation of Pennsylvania statutes-and the judges, who were from
New England, failed to bring their statutes-resulted in the adoption
from Pennsylvania of most of the laws of the Northwest Territory 7
3
Where, as in Califorma, the English common law was made the
rule of decision questions arose as to which English statutes, if any,
should be considered a part of the common law A review of the man-
ner in which these questions were dealt with in the western territories
will be found in the study of Territortal Courts and Law referred to
above.74 In California the questions were causing difficulty as late as
1917 75
71 Id. at 47.
72 1 Cal. 588, 602-03 (Appendix) (1850).
7 3 Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier, 60 MICH. L. BREv. 317, 324, 334
(1962).
74 Blume & Brown, Territorial Courts and Law (pt. II), 61 MicH. L. RFv. 467,
478-523 (1963).
7 5 In Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 293, 168 Pac. 135, 136 (1917),
Henshaw, J., stated: "It would be strange, indeed, if our legislature should have de-
signed to limit the applicability of the code section to the ancient and frequently
most barbarous rules and customs of the common law, and in so doing refuse to take
into account the mitigation of their harshness and the broadening of the rules them-
selves which followed the successive enactments of the English statutes. To the con-
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Due to the absence in frontier areas of the books necessary to
determine how far the English common law had been modified by
English statutes, and due to the absence of the statutes themselves,
attempts were made to have the applicable English statutes listed or
reprinted or re-enacted as American statutes.76 Another solution to the
problem was the adoption of codes which would in effect re-enact all
English statutes that otherwise would be in force as part of the com-
mon law 77 Referring to the decision of California's first Legislature to
adopt the common law, Kieps, in "The Revision and Codification of
California Statutes 1849-1953," Ts states:
While this decision avoided the necessity for the legislature's at-
tempting to enact a complete code of laws, that first session did enact
detailed statutes governing crimes, criminal procedure, civil and pro-
bate procedure and corporations, with the result that substantial por-
tions of the law were in effect codified for the time being.79
The concept of "complete" codification was kept alive, and ultimately
prevailed. 0
An influence of the California frontier-as distinguished from
frontier influences common to all frontier areas-will be found in
section 621 of Field's Civil Practice Act of 1851.
In actions [in justices' courts] respecting "Mining Claims," proof
shall be admitted of the customs, usages, or regulations established
and in force at the bar, or diggings, embracing such claim; and such
customs, usages, or regulations, when not in conflict with the Consti-
tution and Laws of this State, shall govern the decision of the action.81
trary, we hold that our legislature in its use of the phrase 'common law' had in con-
templation the whole body of that jurisprudence as it stood, influenced by statute, at
the time when the code section was adopted." Shaw, J., dissented from the statement
that the "common law of England" includes the law "as it stood influenced by statute"
when the code section was adopted in 1850, saying: "In 1850 there were in England,
I have no doubt, many general acts of parliament in force which no one would claim
were adopted as part of our law by the act of our legislature." Id. at 299-300, 168
Pac. at 139.
76E. BROWN, BrISH STATUTES IN AMRImcAN LAw 1776-1836 at 23-46 (1964).
77 Blume & Brown, supra note 74, at 512-13.
7842 CA=aF. L. REV. 766 (1954).
79 Ibid.
so Id. at 766-779.
S Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 621, at 149. The San Jos6 Daily Herald, November 18,
1879, after quoting this section of the Practice Act, stated: "The principle contained
in the fifty-two words above quoted was adopted in other mining regions of the coun-
try, and finally by the Congress of the United States. The author of it has seen its
wisdom vindicated by more than twenty-eight years of experience, and for it the
people of the State and of Nevada should ever hold him in grateful remembrance.
When they think of hum only as a judge deciding upon the administration of laws
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An adaptation to California conditions will be found in a provision that
in the courts of specified counties "it shall be lawful, with the consent
of both parties, to have the process, pleadings, and other proceedings
in a cause in the Spanish language."82 Section 219 of the Civil Practice
Act of 1851 contained liberal exemptions from execution including
mining equipment and the "law libraries of an attorney or counselor."83
Field's biographer-Swisher-states:
Although generous humanitarian legislation has characterized
much of the frontier law-making experience, it is to be noted that at
this time Field's leadership in the movement suggested a tolerance
and human sympathy quite different from the rigid attitude toward
debtors which had been taken by his forebears, and which seemed
more nearly to characterize him in his later years. He took pride in
the fact that he supported a homestead exemption bill, and that he
helped successfully to resist a reduction of the exemption from five
thousand to three thousand dollars.84
In an attempt to explain certain paradoxes in Stephen J. Field's
career, Howard J. Graham, in "Justice Field and the Fourteenth
Amendment"8 points out that "until about 1870, in matters affecting
property rights, Field was a liberal, restrained judge, tolerant of
legislative innovation," but then a change took place. "The mild
paternalist of the fifties become the arch-mdividualist of the seventies
and eighties." 0 Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School in The
Spirit of the Common Law, after referring, to "nineteenth-century
decisions as to the right to pursue a lawful calling and liberty of con-
tract, which bore so grievously upon social legislation,"t stated:
Here it is significant that the prophet of a belated individualist
crusade, the late Mr. Justice Field, had added to a Puritan ancestry
and Puritan bringing up, careful study of the common law and prac-
tice of his profession on the frontier at a time and m a place where
the individual counted for more and the law for less than has been
usual even on the frontier. No doubt the latter circumstance had its
influence.18
framed by others, let them be reminded that in a single sentence he laid the founda-
tion of our mining system so firmly that it has not been, and cannot be, disturbed."
(Reprinted in Pomeroy, op. cit supra note 38, at 5 (both editions).
82 Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 646, at 152.
83 The exemptions provided were more extensive than those provided by § 839
of the draft Code of Civil Procedure of New York "reported complete in 1850."
8 4 Swismm, STmEHN J. FE--C rsmAN OF = LAw 57 (1930).
8552 YALE L.J. 851, 856 (1943).
861d. at 856.
87 Pou=, THE Srnrr oF =u CourtoN LAw 48 (1921).
88 Id. at 48-49.
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But Pound's speculation that a Puritan background plus experience on
the California frontier shaped Field's thinlng m later life is not
supported by the facts. Almost immediately after his arrival in Cali-
forna Field was engaged in strenuous efforts to bring legal order out
of the chaos of individual action by drafting elaborate statutes es-
tablishing a court system, a system of criminal procedure, and a code
of civil procedure. He had no reverence for the common law He was
buoyed by the hopes and promises of the new frontier. In an account
of his "First Experiences in San Francisco" Field stated:
There was something exhilarating and exciting in the atmosphere
which made everybody cheerful and buoyant. As I walked along the
streets, I met a great many persons I had known in New York, and
they all seemed to be in the highest spirits. I caught the infection.
I found myself saying to everybody I met, "It is a glorious
country "89
While the specific reference in this statement was to the "glorious"
weather of the particular day, more than that was involved. The
exhilaration experienced was that of a person who on a "glonous" day
in a "glorious" country is engaged in an "exciting" and "glorious'
adventure.
As California ceased to be a frontier community and the exhilara-
ton originally generated by the "new" frontier gradually faded, there
may have been a return to Puritan ideas, or, as suggested by Graham,
new influences may have entered the picture:
The two historic events wich served to crystallize Field's fears
and affect his reorientation were the Franco-Prussian War and the
Pans Commune. Like many Americans living in the chaos of the Re-
construction period, fearful that their new industrial order might be
jeopardized almost at the moment of its birth, Justice Field was ap-
palled at the recrudescence of revolution in Europe. Under the cumu-
lative impact of successive shocks, and because his personal expen-
ences abroad and in California rendered him particularly sensitive to
these influences, he became an apostle of reaction, determined, in his
own later phrase, "to strengthen, if I could, all conservative men."90
In the 1850's while the last western frontier was still "new" Field
as a legislator, according to Professor Pomeroy, exhibited a "peculiar
talent as a legal reformer," and "exhibited the same tendency upon
the Bench" as shown by his "constant rejection of ancient common-law
89 Fielc, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12.
90 Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YAE L.J. 851, 857
(1943).
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dogmas."91 Field in his early life was not "an apostle of reaction," and
any development in this direction should not be attributed to ls early
experiences on America's "last" frontier.
91 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 38, at 32-33.

